In the Blink of an Eye: The Augenblick of Sudden Change and Transformative Learning in Lukács and Benjamin by Carlin, MA
Carlin, MA (2010)In the Blink of an Eye: The Augenblick of Sudden Change
and Transformative Learning in Lukács and Benjamin. Culture, Theory and
Critique, 51 (3). pp. 239-256. ISSN 1473-5784
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/619641/
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14735784.2010.515400
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
 1 
 
In the Blink of and Eye: The Augenblick of Sudden Change and Transformative 
Learning in Lukacs and Benjamin 
 
 
-Matthew Carlin 
mac2005@columbia.edu 
1-212-678-3604 
 
I am a visiting assistant professor of Critical and Visual Studies at Pratt Institute in New 
York City. My research is focused on politics and aesthetics in Latin America and visual 
cultural studies. 
 
 
Keywords  Augenblick, Transformative Learning, Liberalism, Violence, Walter 
Benjamin, Georg Lukacs, the Zapatistas. 
 
 
Abstract Although much work dedicated to clarifying the link between learning and 
change has made a sincere effort to show how change can be a part of the learning 
process of every individual’s life, the progressive functionalist approach to 
understanding this link in developmental psychology has created a blind spot when it 
comes to a consideration of the possibilities of sudden change.   Developmental 
approaches to understanding change are also evident in macro-level politics, and they 
have increasingly become part of other spheres of social life such as education where the 
individualized inculcation of skills has come to define the progressive mantra of learning 
and telos of schooling (Frymer, Carlin & Broughton, 2009).  
Instead of remaining within the confines of liberal progressivism or functionalism 
that advance a notion of transformation in gradual, piecemeal, and developmental terms, 
change needs to be re-conceptualized to account for the ways that learning can be a 
momentous, sudden, and sometimes violent event.  To this end I discuss temporal, 
sensory, and perceptual change through use of the concept of ‘Augenblick’—a German 
term connoting a fleeting moment of time normally associated with a form of sight.  
Focusing on the theories of education inherent in the work of Georg Lukacs and Walter 
Benjamin I demonstrate how micro- and macro- forms of expressions of the Augenblick 
occurring at not only the individual, but also the social level in the context of 
revolutionary politics forces us to rethink the ways that the dominance of liberal 
conceptions of learning prefigure the horizon of the possibility of change.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Introduction 
When the word Augenblick is broken down into its etymological components we find 
that ‘augen’ refers to something ocular or ophthalmic and ‘blick’ refers to look, glance, 
glimpse, gaze, sight, blink, view, or squint. Consequently, the word ‘Augenblick’ denotes 
a fleeting moment of time typically associated with a form of sight.  The word’s 
connection to change is less literal.  As a word that denotes a fleeting visual moment, 
‘Augenblick’ inherently posits transformation in dramatic terms as a flash of perceptual 
and/or sensory reorientation.   
There are numerous ways of working with a broad conception of Augenblick that 
refer to those moments that bind together time and sight to mark a dynamic change or 
transition. These include anything from the moment of border and boundary crossing, to 
the notion of discontinuity that entails a break from normal functioning.  Specific 
examples include everything from the leverage points of systems theory, Kuhn’s 
paradigm shift, Foucault’s rupture that ushers in a new episteme, Heidegger’s being-
toward-death that connects freedom with the realization of our own finitude, Nietzsche’s 
epiphanic moment of the abyss of vision, to Kierkegaard’s qualitative leap of faith, and 
even Walter Benjamin’s divine violence that marks a sudden transition into a something 
that stands outside the cycle of the foundation and decay of law.  In all of these cases, the 
Augenblick is a moment measured as the shortest possible temporal duration marking the 
transition into something radically new in which preconceived notions of self and the 
world are permanently altered.       
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 I begin with some of the progressive trends, possibilities, and pitfalls in our 
current conceptualization of what is referred to as transformative learning, and move 
toward the concept of Augenblick as both a radical perceptual reorientation indicative of 
a decisionist model of change, as well as exemplary of the ‘divine’ form of violence that 
escapes the sanctioning of the law thereby ushering in the appearance of new sensory 
possibilities reflective of a politics of becoming.  Through utilizing these two examples of 
Augenblick that point to how perceptual and sensory reorientation can happen in 
dramatically sudden and shocking ways, our attention on learning shifts to subject areas 
that are not commonly considered within traditional educational studies while also 
challenging our fundamental understanding of how transformative learning takes place.   
I argue that learning cannot be properly accounted for through developmental, 
functionalist frameworks that posit transformation in a way that always anticipates what 
is to come—thereby relegating learning to an instrumental transfusion of skills and 
knowledge.  Instead, transformative learning needs to be reconceptualized in anti-
progressivist and anti-developmental terms that fully consider the power of sudden, 
violent perceptual and sensory shifts in order to open up our understanding of change in 
socio-cultural life to unforeseen possibilities.       
 
Liberalism and Transformative Learning 
The name Jack Mezirow is virtually synonymous with transformative learning.  As an 
adult educator and learning specialist Mezirow has had an enormous impact on how we 
understand generic processes of cognitive and perceptual transformation, as well as the 
implications that these processes have for educators.  Moreover, Mezirow’s founding 
 4 
work in the field has given rise to a movement of sorts that has not only led to an 
increasing number of studies on educational processes in adults, but has had a profound 
effect on opening up the possibility for individual transformation during a time of life 
when one’s education is generally considered to be over.  Because of the extent of 
Mezirow’s influence on theories of transformative learning it is easy to identify some of 
the common threads that typify the work in this field.  For example, the field of 
transformative learning has generally advocated a notion of change that is conceived of 
as a) a gradual, piecemeal process, b) structural in that transformation is understood as 
progressing developmentally through stages, and c) functional in that predetermined 
goals of development take place via the implementation of planned forms of action.  For 
Mezirow (1990, 1991, 2000) transformative learning takes place through destabilizing the 
meaning one has derived through the course of his/her life, and then reformulating it in a 
way that helps the individual to reflect more critically and openly upon their own 
thoughts and actions as well as those of others.  He argues that there are four ways that 
learning can occur: ‘by elaborating existing frames of reference, by learning new frames 
of reference, by transforming points of view, or by transforming habits of the mind’ 
(Mezirow 2000: 19).  Learning is thus posited as the reorganization of habit and the 
emergence of the new—as in new perception and new cognition—that arise only by 
being unbound from the sociological, cultural, and economic constraints that have served 
as a framework by which commonly accepted assumptions about oneself and others were 
established. For Mezirow, these constraints not only work toward the reification of 
thought, but also the distortion of perceptual-cognitive meaning.  In order to fight this 
distortion and the encroachment of reification, one’s previous perceptual and cognitive 
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habits must be put into question. For him, the reifying structures of the mind and its 
associated distortions are only overcome through the creation of a rational ground from 
which to begin to reassess our understanding of the world and critically reflect upon our 
assumptions.  
According to Mezirow, the creation of the rational ground is facilitated via 
cooperation between the learner and teacher in developing the foundations of what 
Habermas (1984) calls ‘ideal speech situations’. In these social constellations previous 
problems are posed anew, previous frames of reference and expectation are questioned, 
and both long-standing and recently encountered dilemmas can begin to be clarified.  
Following Habermas, Mezirow sets out a fairly straightforward list of preconditions that 
must be met in order for rational dialogue and the possibility of transformational learning 
to take place.  According to him, a framework for rational dialogue must have the 
following: 1) access to more thorough information, 2) an environment that is free of 
coercion, 3) openness and empathy toward others, 4) the ability to assess evidence 
impartially, 5) equal opportunity to present one’s point of view and fully participate in 
the discourse, and 6) the capacity to come to an agreement and verify the results until 
new information comes to light about the issue and can be reassessed accordingly 
(Mezirow 2000: 13).  Consequently, transformative learning centers on changing one’s 
perspective and gaining the ability to process and transmit meaning clearly.  By 
approximating ideal speech acts and developing a more transparent form of 
communication, Mezirow argues that the learner becomes more open to possibility and 
otherness, while acquiring the capability not only to reframe his/her subjective and 
objective assumptions but also to act on them (Mezirow 2000: 23).         
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As the groundwork for the establishment of a critical and open approach to 
reassess and clarify meaning, the ideal speech situation posits that change is incremental 
and one’s ability to participate in dialogue is understood in functional and developmental 
terms.  Mezirow’s functionalism becomes even more explicit when, in adopting the work 
of Deweyan learning theorist Karen Kitchener, he summarizes her seven stages in the 
development of reflective judgment (Mezirow 1991: 124).  Similarly, he also lays out 
seven parallel stages of problem solving that range from interpretation to action and serve 
as the central component of his four forms of learning that are understood as the 
amplification of current frames of reference, the creation of new frames of reference, and 
the transformation of our points of view or habits of the mind (Mezirow 1991: 94).  The 
fundamental idea of transformative learning is to develop these problem solving and 
reflective skills in order to overcome and/or more effectively assess and act upon some of 
the societal and environmental limitations that one faces on a day to day basis such as 
family and relationship problems, economic hardship, problems on the job, and 
deterioration of health.       
In spite of his adherence to developmental forms of learning, Mezirow does seem 
to consider the potential impact of dramatic events or crises as moments that destabilize 
our sense of being and ways of knowing.  He argues that,  
 
 Perspective transformation can occur either through an accretion  
of transformed meaning schemes resulting from a series of  
dilemmas or in response to an externally imposed epochal dilemma  
such as death, illness, separation or divorce, children leaving home,  
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being passed over for promotion or gaining a promotion, failing  
an important examination, retirement. … Any major challenge to an 
established perspective can result in a transformation.  These  
challenges are painful; they often call into question deeply held  
personal values and threaten our very sense of self. (Mezirow 1991: 167; 
 italicization is my own emphasis)  
 
For Mezirow, these moments are sudden, traumatic, and/or violent intrusions into one’s 
life that, while unpredictable in their outcomes, do provide opportunities to perceive and 
understand things anew.  The realization of one’s impending death, a death of a loved 
one, a debilitating illness, a break up of a family, or being a victim of injustice, among 
other examples, can all be forms of crisis that create an instability in the way one makes 
sense of the world.  However, while entertaining the possibility of momentous events as 
incitements to changing one’s perceptual and cognitive habits, Mezirow remains cautious 
in his understanding of transformation, never straying too far from the model of rational 
communication as the foundation for his theory of transformative learning.  Instead of 
understanding moments of crisis, disaster, and/or violence as transformative in and of 
themselves, he posits that they merely serve as platforms from which the pedagogue can 
insert him/herself into the situation in order to begin the facilitation of the learner’s 
progression through the various developmental stages of problem solving and reflection.   
Even in the case when transformative learning theorists are distanced from ideal 
speech and rational communication as the central mode of learning, there continues to be 
an under-appreciation of how sudden and dramatic destabilizing moments serve as a 
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primary source of learning.  Instead of assessing the potential for learning that occurs in 
temporally dramatic terms, much of our understanding of transformative learning 
regularly reverts to either the slow, developmental progression for the capacity of rational 
speech and thought or the gradual embodiment of a new-age holistic morality.1       
The most problematic aspect of how transformative learning has generally been 
conceived of is not related to the central place that the creation of meaning and/or 
habitual patterns occupy in terms of their understanding of learning processes.  Rather the 
primary problem is that there is an under-evaluation of, and lack of attention to the 
question of how meaning and habits are changed, transformed, destabilized, and/or 
reconfigured, and the role that the suddenness of epiphany, surprise, violence, and/or 
shock have on the reorientation of our sensibility, perception and cognition. Similar to 
how transformative learning theorists have always concerned themselves with ways to 
destabilize the taken-for-granted assumptions in learners in the process of clarifying 
meaning, the following puts forth some ways that we may begin to destabilize the 
commonly accepted notions of transformative learning as gradual, processual, 
developmental, and non-violent.   
  
Lukacs’s Challenge and the Shadow of Instrumentalism 
One of the more identifiable and traditionally leftist uses of the notion of Augenblick is 
found in the work of Marxist philosopher, Georg Lukacs who struggled for much of his 
later years to clarify how the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the 
                                                 
1  For an example of how transformative learning is posited as a form of new-age holistic 
morality see Sullivan, Morell, and O’Connor (2002). 
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context of a Marxist revolution necessitates a theory of radical and creative intervention.  
Although not normally construed as a theory of education, Lukacs’ use of the concept of 
Augenblick in his theory of revolution necessitates a consideration of how learning is 
primarily a creative social phenomenon that combines a perceptual and cognitive 
transformation, the possibility of which occurs in a fleeting moment that presents itself in 
the blink of an eye.  Through his use of the concept of Augenblick Lukacs is able to 
avoid some of the didactic and patronizing pitfalls that plague many Marxist theories of 
education that typically call upon the all-knowing vanguard to instill in the poor worker 
the ‘correct’ knowledge of his/her situation.   
As a young revolutionary in the 1920s, Lukacs was confronted with the dominant 
leftist European view that chose to understand the slow disintegration of the Russian 
revolutionary moment of 1917 as an indication that the objective conditions for the 
revolutionary moment had not yet ripened.  In contrast to this over-emphasis on the 
objective economic conditions of the time, Lukacs foregrounded the subjective role of the 
people in the revolutionary process.  His fundamental argument was that the role of the 
revolutionary subject (i.e., the working class) in its dialectical relationship with the 
objective conditions of revolution (i.e., capitalist crisis) had been vastly 
underemphasized.  Against the proto-positivist Marxists of his era who viewed the 
revolutionary process through the lens of natural law, Lukacs held that even when the 
conditions exist for a revolution to take place, there is never any guarantee that one will 
actually occur.  Instead, transformation becomes dependent on the art of intervention, or 
as Lenin put it ‘the art of insurrection’, when there is a momentary opening (i.e. the 
Augenblick) and opportunity to intervene actively in a situation in order to remake 
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permanently the political and socio-cultural order.  For Lukacs, the critical opening in the 
dialectical relationship between the subject and object is: 
 
A situation whose duration may be longer or shorter, but which is  
distinguished from the process that leads up to it in that it forces together  
the essential tendencies of that process, and demands that a decision be  
taken over the future direction of the process.  That is to say the tendencies 
reach a sort of zenith, and depending on how the situation concerned is  
handled, the process takes on a different direction after the “moment”. 
(Lukacs 2002: 55). 
 
This understanding of ‘Augenblick’ marks not only the point at which the 
subjective moment assumes the central place in the process of radical socio-cultural 
transformation but also a complete change in our collective perceptual orientation that 
ushers in the opportunity for a moment of social learning.  For Lukacs, there is no way 
that the objective conditions could alone give rise to revolution because one’s 
relationship with nature is always mediated socially.  In other words, the objective 
conditions are not directly reflected back to the observer/participant in an unadulterated 
manner.  Instead, the relationship between the conscious understanding of the revolution 
and the objective economic conditions must be understood dialectically so that the 
provisional space their interaction provides can be seized by the revolutionaries 
themselves. Once this space is created the subjective element of the revolutionary process 
assumes central importance.  The zenith of this process which creates the space for 
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intervention demands that ‘a decision be taken over the future direction of the process … 
and the day after tomorrow might be too late to make that decision’ (Lukacs 2002: 55).  
This moment of the dialectical relationship between subject and object provides the 
impetus for the perceptual reorientation, as in ‘I can see clearly now’, of the Augenblick.  
The transformation is both perceptual and cognitive.  The moment instigates a 
perceptual reorientation through opening the present situation to possibilities previously 
unnoticed and consequently unattainable.  This new perception, best understood as an 
intuitive or epiphanic moment, is followed by a cognitive ‘coping’ of the situation that 
determines the formation of a plan of action to take advantage of the newly apparent 
possibility.  For Lukacs, it’s that moment that must be seized before the intuition fades as 
a result of the reconfiguration of the situation - thereby extinguishing the possibility for 
intervention and diminishing the demand for revolutionary change to a mere request for 
reform.    
There are parallels with Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning in that 
‘disorienting dilemmas’, like the zenith of a revolutionary moment, create opportunities 
to alter ones perceptual and cognitive orientations radically and permanently.  In 
Mezirow’s case, the possibility to learn is brought about by a crisis that is seized upon by 
teacher and student in much the same way that Lukacs imagines the revolutionary 
opening being seized by the communist party and the working class.  However, there are 
two distinct differences: 1) while the opening for an active pedagogical intervention is 
premised on disorientation in Mezirow, the Augenblick in Lukacs is a product of a 
moment of clarity, and 2) While the augenblick in Lukacs’ theory of the revolutionary act 
is the social product (learning moment) of a collective will, Mezirow identifies 
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tranformative learning as primarily taking place at the individual level. The danger of the 
prioritization of the individual is that the act of seizing the moment on the part of teacher 
and learner can easily become instrumentalized (a danger for any functionalist account of 
learning), while for Lukacs the moment of clarity and intervention into the moment is 
based on a transcendental perceptual reorientation that is bound to a collective conception 
of history.   
In summary, Lukacs’s theory of Augenblick allows us to newly consider 
transformative learning processes that work temporally through a strictly non-
progressive, and non-developmental logic. While learning is here posed as an opportunity 
that presents itself in dramatically sudden terms that disturbs the teleology engrained in 
liberal ideology, it also works to fundamentally shift our focus on learning away from the 
individual realm and into the social.     
 
Walter Benjamin and Adult Learning 
Who will educate the educators? 
- Question posed by Karl Marx in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1998 
[1924]: 569-74)2   
Connected to the rejection of the possibility of sudden change found in liberal, 
developmental theories of change, is the absolute aversion to violence.  While this 
aversion might initially appear as the result of a well reasoned commitment to, or moral 
                                                 
2  This question is reframed by Adorno (1998 [1959]: 100) in the context of wondering 
how education would be able to contribute towards ensuring that the past horrors of the holocaust remain 
present in a way that diminishes the possibility of a return to fascism.   
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plea for non-violence, upon further scrutiny we find a fundamental and contradictory 
flaw to this position:  liberalism’s prioritization of the individual inherently elevates the 
clearly identifiable, sensational form of violence to the highest level of horror.  In other 
words, by prioritizing the most sensational form of violence - that which is committed by 
clearly identifiable individual actors - the insidiousness of systemic/social forms of 
violence are smoothed over and obscured, while potentially emancipatory forms are 
completely discounted a priori (Zizek, 2008, Balibar 2002).   
A similar situation exists within contemporary liberal theories of transformative 
learning where change is completely dissociated from any form of violent disruption and 
is consequently relegated to a simple leveling out of habitual patterns of cognition.  One 
of the major influences that Mezirow acknowledges in his own work is psychiatrist and 
learning theorist Roger Gould whose position is exemplary of the liberal approach to 
learning.  According to Gould,    
 
while children mark the passing years by their changing bodies,  
adults change their minds.  Passing years and passing events slowly  
accumulate, like a viscous wave, eventually releasing their energy  
and assuming new forms in altered relationships with both time and  
people.  By recognizing the patterns, we may gain some control over  
the forces by smoothing the transition and muting the peaks and  
valleys of adult life phases. (Gould 1975: 218)  
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For Gould, as well as for Mezirow, learning in the individual becomes dependent on the 
ways that the teacher is able to facilitate a series of seamless transitions through a set of 
developmental stages in people’s lives.  Minimally, and perhaps most optimistically, 
what learning theorists such as Gould and Mezirow attempt to do is illustrate how small, 
life-sustaining change is possible for everyone.  While that is certainly a legitimate 
concern, it is important to avoid allowing this developmental approach to homogenize 
our understanding of violence, and discount from the outset the ways that it is tied to 
transformation.  As a result, this section focuses on some of Walter Benjamin’s work in 
order to link transformative learning to sudden, socially oriented forms of violence.    
 The work of Walter Benjamin is a good place to start for three reasons:  First, his 
work helps us to consider how sudden transformative moments of learning do not 
dissipate with the onset of adulthood; secondly, he incites us to rethink the political 
dimensions of temporality as they relate to notions of learning; and thirdly, he replaces 
the understanding of education as a leveling out of individual life transitions and the 
gradual acquisition of critically reflective skills with a conception of education tied to the 
Augenblick of both the moment of danger, and what he calls ‘divine violence’.  
For Benjamin, like his fellow Marxist philosopher Lukacs, the process of learning 
was essentially a social phenomenon that happened in sudden and momentous ways as a 
flash of transformational illumination.  To summarize what I have tried to argue 
elsewhere in much more detail (Carlin 2010), Benjamin understood the difference 
between the learning of children and adults in capitalist society as being primarily due to 
the increasing degree with which contemplation came to dominate the ways that we make 
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sense of the world.3  His argument went something like this: with increasing exposure to 
the commodity form in capitalist society the world around us would become increasingly 
detached, distant, and foreign, resulting in the gradual replacement of a somatically 
oriented form of knowing with an ever-greater degree of contemplation that is 
representative of capitalist epistemology.  The end result would be the emergence of a 
comparatively static vision of the world where transformative possibility could only be 
conceived of in distant and abstract terms instead of as a concrete product of our own 
making.   
While there is no specific mention of adult forms of learning in Benjamin’s 
writing, there is a theory of transformative learning connected to adult life that is 
identifiable in at least two parts of his work.  One example appears in his famous essay 
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ (1968 [1939]: 253-64) where he refers to the 
illumination that can occur in those instances of socially oriented forms of danger that 
challenge the homogeneity of developmental and progressivist forms of time.  Another 
example is found in his essay ‘Critique of Violence’ (1986b [1921]: 277-300) where he 
discusses education in terms of the radically shocking and destabilizing power of ‘divine 
violence’ to disrupt our normal sensory orientation.  In both accounts, the transformative 
aspect of learning is conceived of not as a gradual development toward a predetermined 
telos but as a dramatic change that happens in the lightening quick moment of an 
Augenblick.  
                                                 
3  For an account of how Benjamin conceived of how learning takes place in childhood see 
his essay ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ (1986a [1933]: 333-36).   In this account his conception of childhood 
learning is similar to the position argued by Gould above where attention to the body in 
childhood/adolescents gives way to the dominance of the mind in adulthood. 
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Learning in the Moment of Danger 
The theory of learning present in Benjamin’s essay ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ 
(1968 [1939]: 253-64) pivots on the destabilizing effect that characterizes a moment of 
danger.  For Benjamin, it is this moment that creates a brief possibility for the radical 
transformation of our normal perceptual orientation.  The possibility that arises in a 
moment of danger, he argues, takes the form of a mental image that weakens the 
dominant view of history as a smooth functioning developmental continuum - one written 
by the victors, largely devoid of conflicting perceptions, and thus limited in its depiction 
of the possible (i.e., blind to anything other that the status quo).   
This moment of discontinuity fosters the emergence of a fleeting opportunity to 
connect the present with the past; raising the victims of modernity’s seemingly endless 
array of catastrophes out of the depths of obscurity and into the truth of the now.  In other 
words, it is the moment of danger that brings the past – governed by the interests of the 
ruling class and strewn with the bodies of the oppressed - into the present as an 
inspirational force to alter the course of time.   Forming a memory of the oppressed 
provides a motivational force to change the trajectory of history.  This momentary 
mnemonic flash must be grasped in the blink of an eye before our perspective on the 
present is neatly fitted back into the traditional arrangement that preceded the danger; 
returning us to ‘homogeneous’ time that eliminates the oppressed and the possibility of 
radical transformation.   
For Benjamin, the transformative possibility of the present is obscured behind the 
monotonous drone of the teleology of history dominated by the perspective of the victors.  
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Under these circumstances thinking can only be understood as an unthreatening and 
progressive cognitive activity that gradually builds upon the achievements of the past, 
confining us to a conception of time that precludes transformative possibility.  For 
Benjamin, however, genuine thinking is not about reconciliation with the present course 
of things, but is about working to radically disrupt our established perceptual coordinates 
as they relate to time and the possible.   
 
(T)hinking involves not only the flow of thoughts but their arrest as  
well.  Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with  
tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into  
a monad. A historical materialist approaches a historical subject only  
where he encounters it as a monad.  In this structure he recognizes the sign  
of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary  
chance in the fight for the oppressed past. (Benjamin,1968 [1939]: 262)   
 
Benjamin’s conception of the transformational moment of learning is thus bound to a 
radically different conception of time where impending catastrophe provides the 
dialectical image that brings the past into contact with the present in a way that radically 
shocks the developmental flow of thought and opens up the possibility for a revolutionary 
form of intervention.  The stability of empty homogeneous time is ‘burst’ open by 
‘Jeztzeit’ - a moment of history that protrudes from the continuum and stops the 
established flow of thought to provide an opportunity for a radical change in perspective 
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that now operates on the side of the oppressed (1968 [1939]: 260).4  For Benjamin, in 
order to grasp the transformative possibility in the moment of danger one must possess a 
presence of mind (Geistesgegenwart)5 that instead of dissipating in the midst of crisis 
seizes the chance that the interruption of time has generated to create a more just form of 
life.  For the revolutionary Benjamin, transformative learning is not posited as a seamless 
transition from X1 into X2, where small scale progressive forms of perceptual change can 
gradually lead us to a better life.  Rather, learning is conceived as a radically momentous 
and lightning quick transformation from X1 into Y1 that ushers in a drastically different 
perception of the world.   
 
The Zapatistas and the Educative Power of Divine Violence 
Although only briefly examined, the topic of education is talked about in more explicit 
terms in Benjamin’s (1986b [1921]: 277-300) essay ‘The Critique of Violence’.  In this 
instance, instead of highlighting the learning potential that exists in a moment of danger, 
he ties learning to a very specific conception of violence; discussing what he calls the 
‘educative power of divine violence.’  In order to clarify the link that Benjamin identified 
between these two seemingly disparate subjects, we have to first outline how Benjamin 
conceived of violence.     
For Benjamin, the ultimate goal of this essay was to outline a kind of violence that 
wouldn’t serve in either a law founding capacity or in the defense of already established 
                                                 
4  This is similar to what Jacques Ranciere (1994) and Panagia (2000) call the ‘untimely’.   
Ranciere is referring both to an illegitimate and unaccepted form of time that is unbound from the dictates 
of a conception of history that only acknowledges and is able to identify that which it can causally predict.         
5  I owe the use of this term to Michael Lowy (2002:44).   
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law.  To this end, Benjamin explains that essential to both the founding and sustenance of 
law are the state institutions of the military and the police.  In both cases, these 
institutions serve to clear the terrain for the establishment of law and also subordinate the 
populace to the dictates of already established law.  
 
   The function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that  
lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to  
be established as law, but at the moment of instatement does not  
dismiss violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it  
specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence, but  
one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of power.   
Lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate  
manifestation of violence. (Benjamin, 1986b [1921]: 295) 
 
The problem for Benjamin was how to conceive of a form of violence that did not operate 
in the service of the law at any point.  Thus he was confronted with the task of 
developing a theory of transformation that was seemingly in debt as much to anarchism 
as it was to Marx.  This implied accounting for the emergence of a violence that escaped 
both the state’s monopoly of its use (e.g. by the police and military), and the endless 
cycle of its own decay and re-foundation that would inevitably lead to the emergence of a 
new state in need of the establishment of its own legal framework after the previous one’s 
dissolution.  For Benjamin, this type of violence, connected to the endless dialectic of 
foundation and decay, was what he referred to as ‘mythical violence’ - a judicial form of 
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violence, enacted in order to establish and defend state power.  In contrast, he proposed 
what he calls “divine violence” as a boundless, law destroying form of violence wielding 
a revolutionary force that was capable of permanently undermining the reestablishment 
of the state, its law, and the tautology endemic to its explanation of means and ends.  
Divine violence does not operate in the service of the formation of a new order, but rather 
in the service of a transformational creativity not subsumed by the dictates of a new law 
or telos.   
 
 If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law destroying; if 
 the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if  
 mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only 
 expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody 
 the latter is lethal without spilling blood (Benjamin, 1986b [1921]: 297).  
 
For Benjamin, while justice is the principle of all divine or pure violence, the acquisition 
and maintenance of power is the priority of all mythical lawmaking (1986b [1921]: 294). 
 Although notoriously difficult to clarify, the one specific example of divine 
violence that Benjamin provides is that of the syndicalist general strike - a work stoppage 
aimed at destroying the power of the state to institutionalize, appropriate, and undermine 
socialist ideals and refusing to utilize its various apparatuses at any time to carry out their 
goals.  The example of the general strike is significant for three reasons: First, it 
elucidates the influence that Georges Sorel had on Benjamin’s own thoughts regarding 
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politics and violence6; secondly, it provides us with an outline of a form of radical, anti-
state politics that is less intended as a form of blood spilling than it is a form of socially 
oriented action designed to inhibit the state’s ability to appropriate its political intentions; 
and thirdly, it helps to clarify the connection in Benjamin’s work between contemporary, 
socially oriented forms of violence and his specific theory of learning.  
In spite of the difficulty in identifying contemporary forms of divine violence, we 
are able to point to some recent examples.  One of the clearest contemporary examples of 
a social movement that fits the above mentioned criteria outlined in the example of the 
general strike that combines a resolute distrust of the state and a commitment to the 
eradication of class divisions is the indigenous (led) Zapatista movement that emerged in 
Chiapas, Mexico in the 1990’s.7  On January 1st, 1994, thousands of armed indigenous 
farmers that served as the foundation of the movement took over the 7 main cities and 
towns in Chiapas in an attempt to reclaim stolen land and put an end to hundreds of years 
of destructive state and federal government policy that had pushed the survival of their 
communities to the brink.  The armed wing of the Zapatistas (EZLN—The Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation) that overtook army barracks as well as state and local 
police headquarters was not aimed at claiming state power or institutionalizing their 
                                                 
6  There is a much larger discussion here regarding the similarities and differences between Sorel 
and Benjamin in terms of their respective understandings of myth, violence, and politics.  However, for the 
sake of this essay, I only wish to refer to a few of the more important similarities that contribute toward 
clarifying the ways that a theory of transformative learning exists within Benjamin’s conception of divine 
violence.    
7  Another example is arguably the Brazilian Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra 
(Landless Workers Movement). 
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revolutionary ideals after the attack.  Instead, the Zapatistas attempted to clear the 
political terrain for the possibility of a new form of life that would elude the cycle of 
mythical violence and thus establish itself as a politics of becoming.8  In other words, 
Zapatista violence and the associated reclamation of land from large scale landowners 
resulted in the creation of new geo-political territories known as ‘autonomous rebel 
municipalities’ that have served as the platform from which to redefine what there is to 
see, say, and hear in these places in a way that was previously unavailable to them.9   
In order to deny the restitution of the mythical violent aspects of the state and it’s 
‘mal gobierno’ the task for the Zapatistas was threefold: 1) to create a new political 
formation and space that would not succumb to the professionalization of politics and the 
corresponding institutionalization of an official Zapatista political party; 2) to avoid the 
development of a hierarchical local political structure that would oversee the construction 
and maintenance of the autonomous municipalities; and 3) to decrease the likelihood that 
future generations of the movement would become intoxicated by its armed and violent 
component. 
                                                 
8  I would add that this aspect of the movement clearly differentiates it from the vast history of state 
focused revolutionary struggle in Latin America over the last century.   By ‘becoming’ I do not mean to 
imply that the Zapatistas struggle is based on an avoidance of accomplishment, but rather that their idea of 
accomplishment intentionally lacks any sense of finality; remaining at all times vigilant against the 
potential institutionalization of its political aims.     
9  An example of what Jaques Ranciere would call a ‘redistribution of the sensible’ where politics is 
identified as the disturbance in the previous aesthetic division of the sensory realm (i.e. ‘the police’) by 
those (the indigenous of Chiapas) whom had no part in the ‘perceptual coordinates of possibility’ within the 
context of Mexico (2005: 3).   
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Zapatista autonomy has become the possibility to create something at a strict 
distance from the state, on their own, and without the intervention of the Mexican 
government that is ultimately subject to the control of national and international 
economic interests. As a president of the rebel municipality of Ernesto Che Guevara told 
me during a conversation: 
 
We are asking to be autonomous in that those who are governed  
are also the people who are governing. …The people of this municipality  
have the right to elect their own authorities, and not be named, governed, 
or ordered to do anything by any political party. …Our autonomy is  
actually the contrary to how the federal and state governments are run; by 
ordering the people to follow their orders.  We will not carry out what the 
government tells us to do.  In order to be autonomous, the community has  
to decide and create their own system of authority within the municipality.   
This is where they have their own commissions governing education,  
health, justice, etc., and it is from these roots that we want to be autonomous.  
(Carlin 1999)  
 
The new Zapatista municipalities created amidst the sudden and violent emergence of the 
Zapatistas in 1994 changed the sensory parameters of possibility, ushering in new ways 
to see and speak about such issues as governance, health, education, gender, and land. 
There is a similarity here between the way that the Zapatista violence during the 
first days of 1994 worked on the sensory parameters of possibility and the way that 
 2
4 
Georges Sorel (2004 [1908]) describes the role of the general strike in the context of 
syndicalism.  For Sorel, the general strike is the primary ‘method of expression’ of the 
syndicalists because it is able to ‘throw a full light on things’ in a way that fully 
illuminates the opposition between workers and capitalists.  The act of the general strike 
provides an ‘image’ of what is at stake that is grasped ‘intuitively’ and ‘instantaneously’ 
in a way that ‘language cannot give us in perfect clarity’ (2004 [1908]: 128).  Although 
not focused on creating an image of worker initiated socialism, the ‘divine violence’ of 
the Zapatistas created an ‘image’ of the plight of indigenous peoples in Chiapas that was 
‘instantaneously’ brought into sharp relief against the policies of neo-liberal capitalism.  
The success in immediately creating such an ‘image’ that intuitively resonated with 
millions of people around the world is precisely the reason that the Zapatistas were able 
to garner such widespread international support in the hours, days, and weeks that 
followed, in effect inhibiting the Mexican government from violently annihilating the 
Zapatista bases of support at the outset.   
The avoidance of the foundation of a new law and telos and the coinciding 
reemergence of mythical violence has been a tricky task, the difficulty of which has not 
gone unnoticed by the Zapatistas themselves. In a recent interview, subcomandante 
Marcos of the EZLN speaks about the fears that many members of the Zapatista 
resistance had during the 90’s about the next generation of the movement: 
 
Our worst nightmare was that the armed guerillas (the EZLN) would  
begin to produce followers. Usually, political military groups produce  
little guerrillas, who along with other people come to find that the only  
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way to advance (the movement) would be through the military, even  
though that military might be the EZLN.  Fortunately, that didn’t  
happened with the EZLN - the movement had given birth to other  
types of people: young people that grew up as part of the resistance.   
These were kids that grew up in the era of the uprising, and thanks to  
the strength of Zapatista supporters are now autonomous authorities— 
promoters of education, or of health not merely followers of an armed  
struggle (Castellanos 2008: 34-35; this is my translation of this passage 
and the italicization is my own clarification).  
 
For Marcos and the Zapatistas, there was a (very) real possibility that the 
temptation to engage with the state in a cycle of perpetual violence would eventually be 
acted upon and come to define the political trajectory of the movement.10  The concern 
for Marcos as it relates to the violence inherent in the Zapatista movement was not an 
ideological one but rather a phenomenological one. The question became whether or not 
the first generation of Zapatistas were going to create enough force and energy in the 
Zapatistas as a social movement in order to lessen the exhilarating and romantically 
intoxicating experiential effects of the original violence of the EZLN.  For the Zapatistas, 
the possibility of creating a form of socio-cultural life existing at a distance from the 
reach of the ‘mal gobierno’ (bad government) has been bound up with the very problem 
and use of violence from its very inception.   
                                                 
10  This situation is perhaps most identifiable in the development of the F.A.R.C. – the Spanish 
acronym for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.   
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What has occurred in the second generation of Zapatistas has been nothing less 
than remarkable.  Instead of increasingly identifying the movement with the army (i.e. the 
EZLN), the most recent generation of Zapatistas has been able to sublimate this excess of 
euphoria into a steadfast commitment to the further development of their liberated 
territories over and above a violent confrontation with the state.  Consequently, they 
maintain the possibility for future violence only in a position of subservience to the 
movement, instead of the other way around.  In other words, the Zapatistas remain armed, 
but since their initial violent uprising they’ve chosen to consider violence only in the 
cases where they are attacked by the Mexican army or local paramilitary groups.11   
                                                 
11  What is striking about the accounts of Zapatista violence from the early days of the movement is 
their pronounced lack of cruelty.  The initial confrontation between the EZLN and the Mexican army in 
1993 took place at a federal army barracks in the Lacandon Jungle 6 months before the official appearance 
of the Zapatistas.  As the EZLN made its way toward the barracks they announced to the soldiers there that 
they had a decision to make: they could either immediately dessert the barracks and flee unharmed, or they 
would be killed (Castellanos 2008).  The exact same choice was provided to all of the targets of the EZLN, 
including land owners and city police, throughout the 12 days of war between the EZLN and the Mexican 
army beginning on January 1st, 1994.  By all accounts, even in the case of the EZLN’s 1994 kidnapping of 
the violently racist, former governor of Chiapas, General Absalon Castallano Dominguez, there was a clear 
lack of cruelty involved.  Castellano Dominguez and generations of his family were renowned for 
innumerable acts of the torture, kidnapping, and murder of indigenous peasants across Chiapas in the 
protection of the more than 7 million hectares of the state’s richest farmland that belonged to the 19 
‘families of Chiapas’ (Ross 1995).  Instead of torturing him or possibly even executing him, the Zapatistas 
symbolically sentenced him to spend his life carrying out hard labor in indigenous villages, eventually 
leaving him to live the rest of his days with the ‘shame’ at having been pardoned and let go by the same 
people who he and his family had ruthlessly killed and plundered for more than a century (Ross 1995).     
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 While the transformative aspect of divine violence is apparent, what constitutes its 
‘educative power’ seems less clear.  Benjamin formulates the educative power of divine 
violence in anarchistic terms as that which challenges the institutionalization of learning.  
For Benjamin, the link that divine violence has with education exists in the way that it 
works to disturb our relationship to ‘goods, right, life, and such like, never absolutely 
with regard to the soul of the living’ (1986b [1921]: 298).  In other words, instead of 
being posited as a form of destruction aimed at physical annihilation, divine violence is 
that which works primarily to destroy and consequently rearrange the ways that we 
(among other things) relate to our material environment and conceive of our means of 
subsistence, formulate our forms of governance, and relate to each other on a day to day 
basis.        
While both divine violence and mythical violence are “annihilating,” divine 
violence is neither compelled nor sustained by either the physical subjugation of human 
beings or the re-establishment of a new state.  Consequently, what is educative about 
divine violence is the way that it operates at the sensible or sensory level - the way that it 
dramatically lays the foundation for the emergence of a new form of life that remains 
open to a future which is not preordained or inscribed in law.  What is transformed is the 
scope of possibility - the way that divine violence changes what there is to see and do in a 
specific location.  Education in the context of divine violence marks an interruption in the 
state’s institutionalization of learning, becoming a descriptor of a practice of general 
cultural life with new sensory possibilities.12  The answer to Marx’s question above is 
                                                 
12  Similarly, in a 1960 speech, Che Guevara states,  
 The first recipe for educating the people is to bring them into the revolution.  
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answered - with a new form of life that now stands outside of the law of the state, the 
official title of educator and the institutional and hierarchical framework that ensured its 
sustenance disappear. 
There is another important aspect of Benjamin’s theory of violence that ties 
education to the transformational aspects of religion.  By granting divine violence an 
educative power, Benjamin (1986b [1921]: 277-300) is positing the transformational 
moment of any learning that results from the annihilating impact of a form of destruction 
as a type of permanent conversion.  A similar argument is developed by Balibar (2002) 
when he makes the point that institutional education has always been connected to a 
‘soft’ violence where the proposed acquisition of seemingly innocuous skills, capacities, 
ideas, and knowledge amount to:  
 
a deconstruction of an already existing identity and a reconstruction of a  
new one. …I would go so far as to say: it (education) has to be a  
dis-membering in order to become a re-membering or recasting of the  
mind - which  inevitably confers on the mind a mode of existence which  
                                                                                                                                                 
 Never assume that by educating the people that they will learn, by education alone,  
 with a despotic government on their backs. The only emancipatory pedagogy is the  
 self-education of the people through their own revolutionary practice.  
 (quoted in Lowy 2007: 125) 
 Because the liberated territories that make up Zapatista autonomous municipalities physically 
operate at a remove from the state, they are inherently anti-statist.   Their Education is not the product of an 
institutionally oriented administration of knowledge, but rather the general cultural life that is their 
revolutionary practice of autonomy.     
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is akin to that of a body.  One could put it in religious terms: all education  
is a conversion. (Balibar 2002: 140) 13 
 
This link between education and conversion is most obvious within the parameters of the 
law of the state, where the ‘soft’ violence of institutions remains a constant within the 
cycle of mythical violence.  However, unlike religious conversion, where there is a 
founding moment of a new law to replace the previous one (e.g., the transformation that 
would create a born-again Christian out of a former drug addict) the transformational 
moment of divine violence that works at the level of the sensible posits learning as a 
becoming.  While the transformational learning moment in divine violence is a product of 
a form of annihilation, the Augenblick of its enactment is less directed towards the 
spilling of blood than it is the creation of new sensible possibility and an associated ‘dis-
membering’ and ‘re-casting’ of the mind that is unbound from the historical cycle of 
foundation and decay.    
 
Conclusion: Another Transformative Learning 
The dominant conception of education and learning in general is not that dissimilar from 
the dominant conception of transformative learning.  What we find in education today is 
that learning is typically conceived of in terms of individual development and 
instrumental forms of skill acquisition.  Transformative learning, while not being 
                                                 
13  As Balibar himself is quick to point out, this is not all that dissimilar from the famous arguments 
made by Althusser (1970) and Bourdieu (1977) on education that primarily critique how institutions 
operate in the ideological service of the capitalist state.   
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intentionally instrumental, does share with dominant conception of education a 
functionalist logic that posits learning in terms of the implementation of a set of 
predetermined goals that are reached with the help of the pedagogue. Although there are 
many ways in which we can critique the dominant forms of transformative learning 
theory, the most critical indictment we are able to level at these developmentally oriented 
models is the way that they limit the possibility of transformation to the dictates of a 
predetermined telos.  In other words, within the context of developmental forms of 
transformation, the path of learning and the goal to be reached are already mapped out for 
us.   
What the suddenness of Lukacs’ ‘Augenblick’ and Benjamin’s ‘moment of 
danger’ and ‘divine violence’ point to, is a form of transformative learning that emerges 
out of what is perceived to be an illegitimate temporality. From the perspective of the 
functionalist logic of developmentalism, sudden dramatic forms of transformative 
learning do not fit within the accepted temporal model of change (e.g., there is no sudden 
learning of skills).  As a result, not only are sudden forms of transformation 
unidentifiable, they are also impossible.   
The transformation depicted in the examples above is not a result of a gradual 
acquisition of a rational skill set for increasing one’s capacity for self-reflection, but a 
form of learning based on dramatic changes in both our perceptual and sensory 
frameworks that happen in the shortest possible slice of time.  In these examples, crisis 
and violence are neither posited as precursors for pedagogical interventions nor 
conceived of in terms that are antithetical to education and learning.  Instead, these 
examples recast transformative learning as a dramatic reconstitution of the ways we see, 
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speak about, and do things that occur in the socially oriented epiphanic, and sometimes 
divinely violent flash of an Augenblick.    
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